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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Christopher Dirk

Baay appeals from

the sentence

imposed upon

his conviction for felony

domestic assault and for being a persistent Violator.

Statement

Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings

According
assault is based

t0 the Presentence

upon

the following facts gleaned

“Suspect Chris Baay

Ramrod

Dr.

Report (“PSI”), Baay’s conviction for felony domestic

is

from a Boise police ofﬁcer’s

married to Trisha Baay.

Trisha’s mother

Carma Addis

They

report:

12132 W.
Baay is 0n

live together at

also lives there.

Chris

probation for a prior incident of felony domestic battery, including strangulation,
against Trisha.

Trisha and

A11 parties reported there

Carma reported that during

was an argument

the argument, Chris

at the

moved

house tonight.

closer t0

Carma

and raised his arm as if he was going to hit her. Trisha attempted to intervene t0
keep Chris from striking Carma. Trisha and Carma reported that Chris then
attempted to punch Trisha but missed and struck Carma. I observed that Carma’s
nose, left cheek and upper lip had red marks consistent With being struck in the
face. Chris ﬂed the scene barefoot despite several inches 0f snow on the ground.
Chris was found at his mother’s house. When Chris was interviewed, he denied
committing a battery or domestic assault. I arrested him for battery and domestic
assault and transported him to jail.”
(PSI, p.3.)

The
years) and

state

charged Baay with felony domestic Violence or assault (prior felony within 15

misdemeanor

48, 60-61, 111-112.)

acquitted

At

battery,

trial,

and alleged

a jury convicted

him 0f misdemeanor battery.

being a persistent Violator.
years ﬁxed, and placed

that

(R., pp.

(R., p.123.)

him on a rider.

The

(R., pp.

he was a persistent Violator 0f law.

Baay of felony domestic Violence
1 1

3-123, 15 1 .)

district court

1

57- 1 61.)

(R.,

pp.47-

0r assault, and

Baay then entered an admission

t0

sentenced Baay t0 ten years with ﬁve

Baay timely appealed.

(R.,

pp.162-165.)

ISSUE
Baay
Did

states the issue

0n appeal

the district court abuse

its

as:

discretion

With ﬁve years ﬁxed, based 0n
statute required at least

its

When

it

sentenced Mr. Baay t0 ten years,

misunderstanding that the persistent Violator

ﬁve years ﬁxed?

(Appellant’s brief, p.5)

The
Has Baay

state rephrases the issue

failed t0

show

on appeal

as:

that the district court’s sentencing determination

was based upon a

misunderstanding of its sentencing discretion with regard to the persistent Violator enhancement?

ARGUMENT
Baav Has Failed To Show That The

Was Based Upon

District Court’s Sentencing Determination

A Misunderstanding Of Its Sentencing Discretion With Regard T0 The Persistent Violator
Enhancement
A.

Introduction

Baay contends

that the district court

enhancement permitted
it

therefore abused

its

it

to

was not aware

that the persistent Violator sentencing

impose a ﬁxed term of incarceration 0f less than ﬁve years, and

discretion in imposing

its

However,

sentence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-10.)

a review of the record reveals that the district court

that

was aware 0f the applicable law and

the scope

of its discretion.

B.

Standard

Of Review

Sentencing determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State

Idaho 741, 745, 52 P.3d 886, 890 (Ct. App. 2002).
has abused

its

discretion, the

When

its

sequence of the appellate court’s inquiry

discretion

speciﬁc choices availability to
exercise ofreason.

it;

and consistently With the

and ﬁnally, Whether the

Sun Valley Shopping

Ctr., Inc. V.

Fuhriman, 137

evaluating a claim that the

is ﬁrst,

court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; second, whether the
the outer boundaries 0f

V.

trial

trial

trial

court

Whether the

trial

court acted within

legal standards applicable to the

court reached

its

discretion

by an

Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d

993, 1000 (1991).

C.

The District Court’s Sentencing Determination Was Not Based Upon A Misunderstanding
Of The Scope Of Its Discretion
The Idaho persistent Violator sentencing enhancement provides that upon a third conviction

for a felony, an individual “shall

be sentenced

t0 a

term in the custody of the

state

board of

correction

LC.

which term

shall

be for not

less than

ﬁve

(5) years

and said term

may

extend for

life.”

§ 19-2514.

In State

the Court

V.

Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 566-568, 990 P.2d 144, 147-149 (Ct. App. 1999),

oprpeals, analyzing the language of LC.

that the persistent Violator sentencing

abused

its

required

it

discretion

When

Li. In State V.

§ 19-2514, as interpreted

district courts

Tome,

from imposing

151 Idaho 779, 781-783, 264

the Court 0f Appeals similarly held that the district court

sentencing hearing,

it

expressed a belief that I.C. § 19-2514

impose a minimum sentence 0f ﬁve years ﬁxed.

to

discretion to

at the

and applying the rule of lenity, held

enhancement did not prohibit

suspended sentences upon persistent Violators.
P.3d 418, 420-422 (Ct. App. 2011),

§ 19-25 14

by Harrington and

m,

Li.

Therefore, pursuant t0 LC.

the district court in the present case

impose a uniﬁed sentence 0f between ﬁve years and

life,

and

had the

suspend the sentence

t0

if it s0 chose.

After indicating that the ﬁxed term was required to be at least ﬁve years, the court asked

both counsel t0 advise him of their Views. The following conversation ensued:

THE COURT:
speak 0n your

Mr. Baay, in a moment I’m going to give you an opportunity

to

own behalf.

Counsel, however, Iwant t0 inquire. The recommendation from the State
plus—six 0r a uniﬁed sentence 0f eight years.

But correct

me

if I

am

is

two-

wrong, but

would be an illegal sentence given the fact he has admitted being a persistent
Violator. It’s n0 less than ﬁve years and up t0 life that I need to impose here. So
it would appear that the Court couldn’t accept the State’s recommendation.
that

Am

I

correct about that?

[PROSECUTOR]:

That’s an interesting question,

experience different district court judges here in
life differently.

least

impose a

Your Honor, because

Ada County View

my

Some have — and it appears t0 be your View — that you have t0 at
minimum of ﬁve years ﬁxed and g0 up to life. But in my

experience, the maj ority feel that the sentence has t0 be at least ﬁve, that

add up

in

that ﬁve-to-

t0 less than ﬁve.

it

cannot

And, [defense counsel],

is

that

your experience here as well?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So my

understanding

—

is it

2520?

I

don’t

know

if

anybody remembers off the top of their head.

THE COURT:

It’s

2514.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

25 14.

My understanding — and I have had people Who

get persistent Violator convictions

Who have

been placed on probation —
ﬁve years in its entirety. For

actually

whatever sentence you get has t0 be at least
instance, you couldn’t send him t0 prison for a one-plus-two 0r zero-plus-three,
but it doesn’t have t0 be ﬁxed. It says that — although I can’t quote you a case, I
is that,

have read case law that reﬂects, again, that it does have to be a prison sentence.
But it says shall be sentenced t0 a term in custody 0f the State Board of
Corrections for not less than ﬁve and may extend t0 life.

The language,

Robbery says sentenced t0 the
Department 0f Corrections for a minimum 0f ﬁve up t0 life. And I think in the
Court’s experience, you can give people riders; you can give people probation on
robberies. So I just believe — I believe What you have to d0 is obviously divide
out the sentence, so I think you can give a two-plus—six, but you have t0 say
something like I’m giving a, you know, two-plus-three for the offense, and I am
I

believe, mirrors robbery.

extending that for purposes of the persistent Violator t0 a zero-plus-three
consecutive.

THE COURT: Thank you for that clariﬁcation.
(Sent. Tn, p.30, L.4

By
sentence

rider)

a

rider.

(explanations added).)

the end 0f the above discussion, the district court recognized

Baay

0f at

— p.32, L.8

t0

least

something other than a mandatory ﬁve-year ﬁxed term

ﬁve years because

Having been

it

(i.e.,

had discretion

to

no suspension, n0

subsequently suspended Baay’s sentence and placed him on

effectively advised

by both the prosecutor and defense counsel

25 14 required only that the uniﬁed sentence

and thanking counsel for “that

it

total at least

clarification,” the court

ﬁve years — not

the

that I.C. § 19-

ﬁxed term alone —

must have understood the law

(i.e.,

LC.

§ 19-25 14),

and simply made the discretionary decision t0 sentence Baay t0 an underlying sentence

0f ten years with ﬁve years ﬁxed.1
Further, the district court’s

was

comment

that

it

needed

t0

“add extra time”

Baay’s sentence

recommendation that Baay be sentenced t0 two years ﬁxed

in apparent reference t0 the state’s

plus six years indeterminate (eight years uniﬁed).2

(E Sent.

Tr. p.17,

adding three years onto the ﬁxed term recommended by the

By

t0

recommended indeterminate term by one

year, the court’s

Ls.5-25; p.38, Ls.17-18.)

state,

but reducing the

comment about needing

t0

“add extra

time” was plainly focused 0n the ﬁxed term of Baay’s sentence. The court would not have needed
to

add three years

to the

ﬁxed term (making

statutorily required. Therefore, the court

t0 a

ﬁxed term

Even
that

less than

ﬁve

it

ﬁve

years) if it believed a ﬁve-year

must have recognized

it

had discretion

ﬁxed term was

to sentence

years.

misperceived

if the district court

sentencing discretion,

its

it is

clear

from the record

any such misunderstanding did not impact the court’s sentencing determination.

error

is

therefore harmless.

Baay

E

State V.

Any

Morgan, 109 Idaho 1040, 1043, 712 P.2d 741, 744

such

(Ct.

App. 1985) (holding that in the context of sentencing, error is harmless, and remand is unnecessary,
“if

it is

plain from the judge’s reasoning that the result

different result

would represent an abuse ofthe judge’s

would not change 0r

discretion”);

ﬂ

if

it

appears that any

211$ State V. Ish,

_

P.3d

_, 2014 WL 2619597 *3 (Ct. App. 2014).

1

Later in the sentencing hearing, the district court referred to the prior discussion about the

“Now, Iunderstand that there may be a difference of an opinion
with regard to how to allocate the time on a persistent Violator. But I have always taken the View
that it is a minimum of ﬁve years.” (Sent. TL, p.37, Ls.3-7.) It is not clear Whether the court was
referring t0 a uniﬁed sentence, 0r the ﬁxed portion 0f a sentence.
persistent Violator statute, stating,

2

Apart from recommending a

recommendation.

rider,

Baay’s

(ﬂ generally Sent.

T11,

trial

p.18,

counsel did not

L.13 — p.19,
6

L.7.)

make any speciﬁc

sentencing

There
sentence if it

hearing

him

is

no indication

was aware 0f its

show

that

incentive t0

it

wanted

in the record that the district court

discretion t0 d0 so.

would have imposed a lesser ﬁxed

Instead, the court’s

to ensure the underlying sentence got

become a law-abiding person,

comments

Baay’s

at the

sentencing

full attention

and gave

to wit:

The Court in this case ﬁnds that, indeed, the Court needs t0 add extra time. You
have put yourself in a position where you’re now treated as a persistent Violator.
The reality is you ever commit any other offense, you’re — the rest ofyour life,
you ’re pretty much going t0 be in prison. That’s where you got yourself Three
felony convictions. And I’m going t0 fashion a sentence that makes sure that that
happens because I think there needs t0 be a sufficient deterrencefor you t0 make
sure that you need t0 change your life around.
So the Court — the underlying sentence is going t0 impose or sentence you to ﬁve
years ﬁxed and ﬁve years indeterminate for this particular case. Now, Iwill retain
jurisdiction, however, and allow for the rehabilitative program — programming in
that retained jurisdiction program Which could last up t0 365 days. If I were the
sentencing judge on all three cases involving the probation Violations, I would
impose the sentence in the other two felony offenses placing you in a position where
you’re either in the custody 0f the Department 0f Corrections undergoing their
programming 0r in the rider program. But that’s how close you are.
(Sent.

TL, p.38, L.17 — p.39, L.17 (emphasis added).)

As

discussed, the district court’s

sentence shows

years.

it

recognized

it

had discretion

(E Sent. Tr. p.17, Ls.5-25.)

(1) another felony conviction

himself into

this situation

would

was

would

likely

go to prison for the

him

“change

[his] life

that

t0 sentence

likely result in

rest

Baay

t0

t0 a

“add extra time”

t0

Baay’s

ﬁxed term 0f less than ﬁve

of his

Baay being imprisoned

felonies

make
life

—

Baay

got

and becoming a persistent Violator; and

(3)

sure that, if

for life; (2)

Baay committed more

crimes, he

in order t0 provide “sufﬁcient deterrence” for

around.” (Sent. Tr., p.38, L.18

it is

needed

it

court’s justiﬁcations for adding “extra time” included

intentionally fashioned t0

sentencing court in mind,
to sentence

The

by committing three

the sentence

to

comment

—

p.39, L.3.)

With

the concerns of the

unrealistic to conclude that, if the court understood

Baay to a ﬁxed term of less than ﬁve years (assuming

it

it

did not before),

had discretion
it

would have

sentenced him to a ﬁxed term ofless than ﬁve years. In sum,
that the result

to a

would not change”

ﬁxed term of less than ﬁve

if the

years.

it is

“plain

from the judge’s reasoning

judge had understood he had discretion to sentence Baay

Morgan, 109 Idaho

at

1043, 712 P.2d at 744.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

DATED this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

sentence of Baay.

19th day 0f May, 2020.

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day 0f May, 2020, served a true and correct
OF RESPONDENT t0 the attorney listed below by means 0f iCourt

copy 0f the foregoing BRIEF
File and Serve:

JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

John C. McKinney

JOHN C. MCKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

JCM/dd

